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Introduction
‘The specific effects of devolution on health policy are clearly 
impossible to predict.’
Colin Leys, BMJ 1999 p. 1155
In 1999, the UK government devolved the responsibility for 
health to national assemblies; this gave the then new Scottish 
Executive Health Department (SEHD) the capacity to take 
different paths from the NHS in England. In the early years 
after devolvement, NHS Scotland stayed as a mirror image 
of NHS England; however, over time, and in response to 
emerging infection control problems, this became less so. 
Although both health departments are still clearly influ-
enced by each other, in some infection prevention and con-
trol (IPC) policy issues and in data presentations, their paths 
have diverged. By the time what can be described as the 
IPC’s lowest point—or nadir—was reached (around 2006), 
experienced as seemingly endless outbreaks of MRSA and 
Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) and with mortality 
from hospital-acquired infections (HAI) still rising, each 
nation was producing different solutions to the same 
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problems. Curran (in press) discusses this IPC nadir in 
detail. Thus, these differences provide an opportunity to 
compare the separate national IPC documents to evaluate 
differing IPC priorities and any successes. As part of a wider 
research project, the aim of the present study was to identify 
national IPC priorities and the indicators of success in the 
UK and Ireland. This paper compares the national IPC pri-
ority documents, the IPC successes—as identified in 
national data and reports—for the acute services of NHS 
England and NHS Scotland (there being insufficient space 
to present all countries’ data in a single paper). The figures 
discussed in this paper are presented online at: web link 
here.
Research questions
Question 1: What are the local and national infection pre-
vention and control priorities?
Question 2: What are considered to be the indicators of suc-
cess and how are they measured?
Methods
Senior representatives from NHS England and NHS 
Scotland were asked to list their national IPC priority docu-
ments (Table 1). These documents were reviewed using a 
structured assessment form. For each document, the IPC 
topic areas were categorised (a topic was considered to be 
an IPC area of work such as ‘surveillance’, ‘decontamina-
tion’ or ‘use of invasive devices’) in order to identify how 
many topics were included in each priority document, how 
many were unique to that document and how many over-
lapped with other priority documents. A topic for which 
multiple priority documents provided instructions or stand-
ards could prove confusing for those trying to follow the 
instructions and those monitoring the people/services doing 
so. A model was selected to best depict the structure of each 
health service (Organisational Cybernetics Model). This 
model enables ‘a shared understanding of the organiza-
tional complexity’ to be communicated (Jackson, 2004, 
p.109). This model also shows the structure of each health 
service and how the relationships and feedback processes 
operate within the individual levels of each system. For 
example, Level I comprises the clinical microsystems that 
represent individual wards, theatres or outpatients and the 
people who staff them. All of Level I report to a higher 
level of management at Level II. Level VI represents the 
highest structure of the organisation, the government’s 
Departments of Health.
The national priority documents were categorised by the 
goals/tasks to be achieved, the levels within the cybernetics 
model responsible for the goals/tasks and any specified 
monitoring authorities. Documents which had overlapping 
topic content, e.g. both specifying criteria to be attained in 
areas such as surveillance or environmental cleanliness, 
were then identified. A schematic was produced showing 
all the documents and where there was overlapping 
content.
Outcome indicator data were identified by retrieving 
national surveillance publications, reports from national 
scrutiny organisations, and from the departments of health 
and social care websites (up to March 2018).
From all the above data, a qualitative assessment was 
made to answer the research questions.
Results
Organisation variation
An Organisational Cybernetics Model for both NHS 
Scotland and NHS England were produced comprising six 
levels (Figures 1 and 2 for NHS Scotland and NHS England, 
respectively). For both England and Scotland, Level I con-
sists of clinical microsystems (CMS), e.g. individual wards 
or departments that report to Level II, a unit/directorate 
management. Several Level II units report into a higher 
level of management (Level III) before subsequently 
reporting to a single Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at 
Level IV. The CEOs in Scotland report to a single board 
(Level V) before all boards report to Level VI, the (now 
titled) Scottish Government’s Health and Social Care 
Department. In England, the CEOs report to the Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) who plan and commission 
services for their areas. All levels (I–VI) in both Scotland 
and England are supported by colleagues, organisations 
and the public at three separate levels.
The first, Support I, comprises service user monitoring. 
In Scotland, this is done formally alongside the Healthcare 
Environment Inspectorate (HEI). In England, Support I 
is provided by Patient-Led Assessments of the Care 
Environment (PLACE) monitoring with service users. Also 
included in Support I is independently and surveyed public 
feedback reporting on services received. Support II includes 
all the service facilitators, e.g. education and training, occu-
pational health, estates management and the microbiology 
lab, who along with internal monitoring provide support to 
Levels I–V. The IPC Team (IPCT) is also part of Support II. 
The IPCT receives and provides information to Levels I–V. 
Support III includes the external support and monitoring 
provided by Health Protection Scotland (HPS), Health 
Facilities Scotland (HFS). the HEI and Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (HIS). In England, Support III is 
provided by Public Health England (PHE), the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) and NHS Improvement. Although the 
designs are very similar, with both having the six recursive 
layers, the overall size and variant structures (reporting and 
commissioning) illustrate the differences.
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IPC priority documents
The IPC priority documents nominated for NHS Scotland 
and NHS England are shown in Table 1. Although NHS 
Scotland listed only five documents, one (DL (2015) 19) 
specifies all required surveillance programmes and the 
required compliance. Similarly, the Code of Practice for 
NHS England lists 25 specific policies to be available 
within Trusts, along with 10 system specifications to 
ensure a safe IPC environment. The overlap in these docu-
ments can be seen in Figure 3 (Scotland) and Figure 4 
(England), and Table 1. NHS Scotland have fewer indi-
vidual topics than NHS England (28 vs. 40) and there is 
less overlap between the documents. Unique topics, those 
appearing in only one priority document, were identified 
in 25% of NHS England documents compared to 64% of 
those published by NHS Scotland. The rationale for multi-
ple documents containing different criteria to be adhered 
to on similar topics is unstated. Apart from compliance 
with the Code of Practice in England being a legal require-
ment, the multiple documents with overlapping content 
results in—from an outside perspective, at least—difficul-
ties for both those who must achieve and monitor adher-
ence to the criteria.
Responsibility for fulfilling the criteria  
in the priority documents
In NHS England and NHS Scotland, most of the topic cri-
teria within the priority documents were tasked to Level I 
healthcare workers (as per the cybernetic models in Figures 
1 and 2) at 26.7% and 24.1%, respectively, and to the IPCT 
at 35% and 41.2%, respectively.
The national IPC priorities
From the reading of the IPC priority documents (Table 1), 
an assessment of the IPC topics and specifications was 
made for both NHS Scotland and NHS England. While the 
policies varied in complexity and overlapped in topics, they 
had similarities and both authorities aimed to:
•• specify the requirements of an IPC safe 
environment;
•• specify the IPC governance arrangements;
•• specify how some IPC procedures are to be 
performed;
•• set up external organisations to:
•○ regulate and monitor healthcare environments, 
governance arrangements and various clinical 
procedures
•○ publish reports of their findings so that the pub-
lic are provided with evidence of IPC safety
•• specify numerical targets or goals, the achievement 
of which would indicate whether the above arrange-
ments were impacting on rates of infection;
•• require organisations to undertake IPC safety within 
a quality improvement framework, i.e. continuously 
improving rates of HAI and continuously minimis-
ing risks;
•• detect and respond to emerging threats.
Apart from the last criteria, these were new requirements 
before 2006.
For both national NHSs, several priority documents 
specify the need for continuous quality improvement (CQI) 
for Levels I–VI, e.g. priority documents: NHS England 2, 
3, 4 and NHS Scotland 1 (Figures 3 and 4).
These results advocate ‘Continuous Quality Improve-
ment’, which is defined as an effective, efficient method 
that aims is to continually improve the overall quality-
related performance (Juran and Godfrey, 1998). This is dif-
ferent from quality assurance, which aims to demonstrate 
that the requirements for quality have been (and can be) 
achieved. The key difference is therefore between meeting 
a requirement and continually improving (Juran and 
Godfrey, 1998).
Quantitative indicators of IPC success
The quantitative indicators, for which there are enough data 
to detect the presence, or absence of, successes are: surgical 
site infections (SSI); MRSA bacteraemia; and CDI. These 
data are collected through national surveillance pro-
grammes that specified the data to be collected, the defini-
tions to be used and the time scales for data submission. 
These data are used to identify the priorities for prevention 
programmes and to guide investigations when data suggest 
significant variations. The significant declines in both 
MRSA bacteraemia and CDI were evident UK-wide from 
2007. This analysis focuses on the trends from 2014 that 
can be used as current indicators of success. Having stated 
that Levels I–V of the organisational cybernetics model 
(Figures 1 and 2) are instructed to use a CQI model, national 
organisations producing accumulated data from health 
boards and Trusts are not. Where possible from the national 
data available in the public domain, statistical process con-
trol charts (SPCs) were produced (by ETC) in order to 
accurately describe the variation in the data as either natu-
ral or unnatural (Benneyan, 1998).
Current MRSA bloodstream infections 
(MRSA BSI)
MRSA BSI data for NHS England have been published in 
spreadsheets, the format of which has been modified over-
time (e.g. total reported, trust assigned, CCG assigned and/
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or third party assigned). However, all these spreadsheets 
have only 12 or 13 months of data per spreadsheet page. All 
spreadsheets used in this analysis were retrieved from the 
UK Government’s live and archive surveillance web pages 
(UK Government, 2018a). As there are only 13 data points 
on a spread sheet, it is neither possible to determine whether 
the data are in or out of statistical control (above or below 
the control limits) nor whether the within-limit criteria for 
being out of control are met. An SPC (produced by ETC, 
from the spreadsheets not shown) of 22 months of Trust-
apportioned MRSA data (May 2016 to March 2018) shows 
the data to be currently in statistical control. The number of 
‘trust-apportioned’ infections for January to March 2017 is 
at 100; for the same period in 2014, there were 106 (UK 
Government, 2018b). Of note, even though the results have 
currently plateaued, the infections reduced from the peaks 
of 2006 have been retained.
For Scotland, the number of MRSA BSI are no longer 
separately produced. These data are combined with MSSA 
BSI data, for which an ongoing increase is evident (HPS, 
2017a, 2018a, 2018b). Thus, a previously achieved target 
and evidence of success in MRSA BSI reductions, has been 
negated by a missed target of MSSA reductions which may 
not itself be achievable. Data are presented quarterly, three 
months in arrears with a limit of 12 quarterly data points 
per spreadsheet. So, once again, within-limit out-of-control 
criteria cannot be assessed. Although SPC charts are pro-
duced in Scotland, they have no lower control limits and, as 
stated, insufficient data for a valid assessment of variation.
Current situation with Clostridium difficile 
infection (CDI)
The same data issues arise with national CDI data, in that 
the data are presented in spreadsheets comprising just 12–
13 months of data. These spreadsheets have also been mod-
ified overtime. All spreadsheets used are available from the 
UK Government’s live and archive web pages (UK 
Government, 2019).
For NHS England data, again spreadsheet presentations 
have been modified over time; however, all are set in a 
spreadsheet of 12–13 months of data. Again, the results are 
not presented to enable easy assessment of data variation. 
An SPC was produced for 24 months of trust-apportioned 
data, showing one out-of-control episode and the overall 
chart with wide monthly variation. Although the chart is 
currently in control, a warning limit was reached in March 
2018. Declines in CDI have also plateaued—this despite 
the target remaining in place and financial penalties being 
applied for failing to achieve them in NHS England. No 
commentary could be found on the data published in these. 
A commentary which interprets both local data and national 
trends is important to ensure that the message being sent via 
graphical representation of the data is understood by those 
receiving it.
For NHS Scotland, the CDI data are presented within a 
spreadsheet with two tables comprising 12 points of data 
(four quarters of three years), for each NHS board (and 
Scotland as a whole) (HPS, 2018a, 2018b). The two tables are 
for ‘healthcare-associated’ (HA) and ‘community-associated’ 
(CA) infections. Alongside the tables in this supplementary 
data are two sets of charts (two for each HA and CA infec-
tions). Both sets of charts have the same title and neither 
states clearly what the data are, i.e. what the lines indicate. 
Their two references for web information lack specific 
guidance as to how to use these charts to detect statistical 
control for SAB or CDI (HPS, 2017b). A commentary is 
provided comparing current to past quarters – but true 
over-time variation comment (i.e. on 25 data points) is 
omitted.
Surgical site infections as indicators  
of success
Surgical site infection (SSI) surveillance is the ongoing 
monitoring of surgical infection rates fed back to those 
involved in the operations (and their managers) and fed for-
ward to national surveillance organisations. Feeding for-
ward enables national organisations to compare data from 
individual centres and identify outliers where specialist 
assistance can be offered. This continuous quality improve-
ment initiative was developed from initial work in America 
which identified that surveillance of SSI with feedback was 
effective at reducing rates of infection (Haley et al., 1985). 
National SSI surveillance programmes are ongoing in all 
countries in the UK. In 2004, surveillance of SSI in ortho-
paedic surgery became mandatory for all English NHS 
Trusts (PHE, 2013). This allows NHS Trusts to compare 
their rates of infection over time against a benchmark rate. 
NHS England has data over several years showing decreas-
ing SSI rates with increased participation PHE (2017). 
Similarly, NHS Scotland publishes quarterly rates of SSI 
data showing sustained low rates of infection for manda-
tory procedures (HPS, 2018a, 2018b). These data can be 
used to indicate success but only for the procedures under 
surveillance.
Qualitative assessments by  
external inspectors
The external monitoring authorities (CQC in England and 
the HEI in Scotland) produce reports of announced and 
unannounced assessments of the IPC healthcare environ-
ment: as seen, as reported by people they talk to and as 
reported by people through surveys. The CQC reports, 
which scrutinise governance, have resulted in improve-
ments in ratings over time; indeed, the CQC report states 
‘[we have] seen that it delivers improved care’ (CQC, 
undated). The publicity surrounding reports and the require-
ment to display CQC ratings informs Trust CEOs (Level 
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IV) what they need to do to have a positive CQC indicator 
of success. PLACE assessments (NHS England), which 
involve the public in evaluations of visible cleanliness and 
condition and maintenance of the clinical environments, 
have yielded an indicator of success. For example, in 2017, 
the national average score for cleanliness was 98.4%, which 
was the highest since such measures began, the median 
score being 99.3% (PLACE, 2017). In Scotland, the HEI 
uses the criteria within the HAI Standards from Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (2015) when inspecting. All reports 
are web-listed under the NHS Board so that anyone can see 
any hospital’s results (Healthcare Improvement Scotland, 
2018). Publications of new standards in 2015 resulted in a 
change to the cumulative reporting, making it difficult to 
determine if there are continued ongoing improvements. 
Certainly, no observed/reported hazardous cleanliness 
issues appear to merit media reporting as there was during 
what was discussed earlier as the IPC nadir (Curran, in 
press).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to evaluate national IPC 
priorities and indicators of success. The national IPC priori-
ties are that people are cared for in an IPC-safe environ-
ment, using IPC-safe procedures. The indicators of success 
are that there is evidence from external reports of this being 
achieved and an absence of external reports of poorly man-
aged risks in the media, e.g. large outbreaks. Also, there are 
national data indicating that numerical infection risks are 
low and staying low.
What the project also enabled was a comparison of the 
ways the NHS in England and NHS Scotland have diverged 
in their goals of achieving IPC safety and the opportunities 
this presents for improvement. Devolution, which began in 
1999, has led to different priority documents that essen-
tially seek the same goals. However, in NHS England, there 
are several documents that have multiple requirements for 
the same topic area, e.g. governance and surveillance 
(Figure 4). Also, whereas NHS Scotland (Figure 3) has 
updated documents and removed redundant ones (e.g. Code 
of Practice), NHS England has added new documents to 
existing ones so that several documents have specifications 
on the same topic. Therefore, from an operational perspec-
tive, it is easier to see from NHS Scotland’s priority docu-
ments precisely what external monitoring agencies should 
be assessing. The production of a national IPCM means 
that 14 NHS Boards are unburdened with producing and 
updating their own policies and thus have more time to 
focus on implementation. Conversely, the NHS in England 
requires all trusts to have and update 25 separate policies. 
For external monitors in Scotland, the focus can be solely 
on implementation, whereas for England, monitors should 
seek assurance that policies are present, up to date and 
being implemented. This is now being addressed in 
England. The periodic updating of the requirements of the 
IPC system in Scotland appears useful (e.g. DL (2015) 19). 
Furthermore, simplifying and reassessing the expectations 
of IPCTs periodically would reduce redundancy and free up 
time for emerging IPC challenges.
From the assessment of national surveillance reports, 
there appears to be a misalignment of purpose. Levels I–IV 
of healthcare organisations are tasked with undertaking 
their work in the context of CQI; however, those producing 
national data are not (Support III, i.e. PHE and HPS; 
Figures 1 and 2). This is evidenced by the data being uti-
lised to compare rates rather than to detect and drive 
improvement, e.g. the HPS SPCs have insufficient data 
points and omit a lower control limit and are thus incapable 
of detecting improved performance. If Support III was 
charged with providing data back to Trusts/Boards using a 
CQI methodology, then the potential for Support II (the 
IPCT) to aid their Trusts/Boards would be greatly enhanced. 
At present, departments of health have tasked national data 
centres, e.g. HPS, HPE, with what is in effect performance 
monitoring. While it is still essential that Support III con-
tinues its epidemiology focus duties, changing from a per-
formance-monitoring to a CQI approach could benefit all. 
Data produced by Support III are often released quarterly—
a quarter behind; this is too slow for effective quality 
improvement. For optimal responses. the data interpreta-
tions must be available as close to real time as is possible 
(Benneyan, 1998). After significant major declines from 
the mid-2000s onwards in both MRSA BSI and CDI, it is 
now difficult to determine or monitor ongoing success from 
published national data. Although the major declines have 
not reversed, results have plateaued. Whether this is an 
indicator of falling IPC performance, increased challenges 
on the NHS system or changes in organism pathogenicity is 
unknown. The continued emergence of other pathogens 
(e.g. carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaecae), some 
of which are being attributed to healthcare, suggests that 
the discussed IPC improvements are insufficient and/or that 
the emerging pathogens are not the result of actions and 
inactions within care settings.
The evidence in this analysis suggests that national data 
producers should be charged with using a CQI approach 
when they feedback data and thus make it easy for those 
receiving the data to address issues in a timelier way. 
Numerical data, even at a national level, should be assessed 
for variation using the accepted CQI criteria. This variation 
should be communicated clearly. This would not only iden-
tify outliers in a negative but also positive sense and allow for, 
as stated, more timely responses to any identified deteriora-
tion of data and thus of systems themselves. Producing data in 
spreadsheets with only 12–13 points of data negates the pos-
sibility of a CQI assessment that requires 25 data points to 
conclude a process is in statistical control (Benneyan, 1998).
Although CDI and MRSA reductions were associated 
with the introduction of national targets, this was by no 
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means a causal relationship (Wylie et al., 2011). New IPC 
performance indicators must plausibly relate to perfor-
mance and be subject to reduction via system change. For 
E. coli bacteraemia (ECB), it is too soon to determine if 
success can be achieved by improved IPC. A recent review 
(Boswell et al., 2018) suggests that as few as 18% of ECBs 
may be preventable. While efforts must be made to prevent 
the preventable, the problem is that data are needed on an 
additional 82% of infections to find the 18% that might be 
preventable. There is also a question on the use of MSSA 
bacteraemia (used in Scotland) as an IPC performance indi-
cator given its intransigence to reduction when compared to 
MRSA.
Healthcare is a complex system involving continuously 
changing people, environments, methods, equipment, 
micro-organisms and culture. Thus, any significant varia-
tion in numerical IPC performance indicators could be 
indicating success (or failure) in any of the component sys-
tem parts that aid/reduce transmission or infection risk. 
Success could indicate IPC improvements and reduced 
surgical risks, but it could also indicate that micro-organ-
isms have gained (or lost) some of their pathogenicity. 
Similarly, increasing microbial rates could indicate 
decreasing IPC performance and/or improved care with 
people living longer and eventually succumbing to an 
unpreventable infection in older age. Thus, the optimising 
of healthcare performance within a CQI framework (at all 
levels) and the analysing of data both epidemiologically 
and using a CQI model is essential. Although statistical 
monitoring will detect significant improvements (and 
deteriorations) in rates, SPCs are unable to attribute rea-
sons for these changes. What can be said for certain is that 
healthcare environments have improved. However, in a 
healthcare system, ‘visibly clean’ may be insufficient 
given the known ability of pathogens to survive in a viable 
state for long periods in care environments. Continuous 
synergistic efforts at all levels of the organisation are 
needed to provide an IPC-safe environment and to enable 
the performance of IPC-safe procedures. Monitoring of 
systems quantitatively and qualitatively will always be 
needed and should always be subject to review and 
improvement.
Limitations
The present study was an independent analysis of national 
priority documents and measures of success. Opinions 
were not sought from those who commissioned the docu-
ments or receive reports on the outputs and inspection 
reports; their views may have been different to those of the 
authors. Additionally, the analysis is written with the bene-
fit of hindsight bias. That is, those commissioning the 
reports and seeking information on their implementation 
were essentially making decisions during uncertainty. At 
the time of commissioning, they could not be certain that 
their national priority documents were the solutions to the 
IPC problems. The project used publicly available data. 
There may be other data analyses available to commission-
ers which supports other conclusions.
Conclusion
To reclaim the confidence of the general public in healthcare 
services, the extant priority documents have enabled an easy 
conclusion to Question 1: The local and national infection 
prevention and control priorities are evidenced by:
•• people being cared for in an IPC-safe environment;
•• staff following IPC-safe procedures;
•• Trusts and boards continuously striving not just to 
attain standards, but to improve on them.
The qualitative indicators of IPC success are evidenced by:
•• positive reports (not just by internal monitoring) of 
fit-for-purpose environments which are visibly clean 
and satisfy service users;
•• an absence of negative media on IPC issues, e.g. 
increasing HAIs and/or visibly dirty care settings.
The quantitative indicators of IPC success are evidenced by:
•• national reports of perceived nosocomial threats 
continuing to decline or at least failing to increase, 
e.g. CDI/MRSA and an absence of major 
outbreaks;
•• SSI surveillance continuing to indicate a low 
incidence;
•• the role of healthcare in their ongoing transmission 
of (re)-emerging pathogens being minimal or absent.
If national agencies that produce data were also charged 
with using a CQI model, then there would be further oppor-
tunities to detect and improve on successes. Furthermore, if 
national NHS authorities learnt from each other, there are 
opportunities to reduce redundancy and create a synergy of 
approach that could further reduce infection risks and the 
burden on those whose job is to keep people safe.
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